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Stability force for the United States

Justification and Options for
Creating U.S. Capabilities

Rand Corp.

I cherry picked a few links from this publication
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*Stability Operations Institute

(PKSOI). Its purpose was to make recommendations to Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (US Army)

*An SPF is a high-end police force that engages in a range
of tasks such as crowd and riot control, special weapons and tactics
(SWAT), and investigations of organized criminal groups.

*Our conclusions are based on several facts and assumptions. First,
it would be optimal to have SPF personnel with civilian police skills,
orientation, and perspective do high-end policing.

*The Need for a Stability Force
Our analysis clearly indicates that the United States needs an SPF or
some other way to accomplish the SPF mission. Stability operations
have become an inescapable reality of U.S. foreign policy. Establishing
security with soldiers and police is critical because it is difficult to
achieve other objectives—such as rebuilding political and economic
systems—without it.

*In some cases,
allied countries may be able to fill this gap. Allies did this effectively
in Bosnia and Kosovo, both of which were successful in establishing
security.In other cases, the United States may not be able to count on
allied support. The United States should not depend on allies to supply
these capabilities, because doing so would limit U.S. freedom of action
on the international stage. Consequently, the United States should seriously
consider building a high-end police capacity.

*we concluded that there are three main
sizing options for an SPF that we would consider: 1,000 police; 4,000
police; and 6,000 police. It would be even more difficult and resourceintensive
to mount stability operations in larger countries such as Iran,
Pakistan, the Philippines, Nigeria, and Venezuela.

*Headquarters in the U.S. Government
Of the options considered, this research indicates that the U.S. Marshals
Service (USMS) would be the most likely to successfully field an
SPF, under the assumptions that an MP option would not be permitted
to conduct policing missions in the United States outside of military
installations except under extraordinary circumstances, and that doing
so is essential to maintaining required skills.

*The authors would like to thank the numerous U.S. and European
government officials and scholars who made time in their busy schedules
to talk about policing during stability operations. Of particular
help were Lieutenant Colonel Donald Bohn, who was responsible for
the project in the U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations
Institute, and his colleagues at PKSOI who shared their insights with
us: Colonel John Agoglia, the PKSOI Director, and Colonel Thomas
Pope. We would also like to thank Lieutenant Colonel Anthony W.
Johnson of PKSOI who took over responsibility for this project after
Colonel Bohn retired.
Others who were generous with their time included Arthur Roderick,
Assistant Director of the U.S. Marshals Service; Richard Mayer
and Robert Gifford of the State Department’s Bureau for International,
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; Robert “Carr” Trevillian of
the Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigation Training
Assistance Program; Raymond Kelly, the New York City Police
Commissioner; Colonel Domenico Libertini, Commander of the Multinational
Specialized Unit in Pristina, Kosovo; and Gert Besselink,
Deputy Commander of the European Gendarmerie Force. Finally,
Charlotte Lynch of RAND provided important technical assistance
that contributed to the quality of this document. All errors remain the
responsibility of the authors.